Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Kenya

The paper examines intrahousehold resource allocation in Kenya and if there exists gender bias. The assumption of a unitary household model is relaxed and a collective household model is used. Demographic separability tests are then carried out to identify 'adult goods' i.e. goods that have pure income effect with the addition of a child in the household. The Deaton Model (1997) is then used to examine the behaviour of budget share of adult goods with total expenditure and lastly tests are carried out using the outlay equivalent ratios to establish if there is gender bias within the households. The Kenya Welfare Monitoring Survey Data for 1997 was analysed; alcohol failed to pass the demographic separability test in urban areas, the study however does not find any gender bias using the Deaton (1997) model. The study concludes that there is a need for further research in this area using individual data

Married with Children: A Collective Labor Supply Model with Detailed Time Use and Intrahousehold Expenditure Information

We propose a collective labor supply model with household production that generalizes an original model of Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005). In our model, adults' individual preferences do not only depend on own leisure and individual private consumption of market goods. They also depend on the con- sumption of domestic goods, which are produced by combining goods bought at the market with individuals' time. We apply our model to new and unique data on Dutch couples with children. The data contains detailed information about the spouses' time use and the intrahousehold allocation of all expendi- tures. Our application uses a novel estimation strategy that builds upon the familiar two-stage allocation representation of the collective model. We obtain interesting (and plausible) empirical results. Spouses' preferences depend on the consumption of domestically produced goods (including children's welfare). Next, Pareto weights depend on variables like the individual wages and the share in the households nonlabor income. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, we do not find evidence that mothers care more for their children than fathers.collective model;labor supply;time use;public goods;household production

"An Empirical Analysis of Gender Bias in Education Spending in Paraguay"

Gender affects household spending in two areas that have been widely studied in the literature. One strand documents that greater female bargaining power within households results in a variety of shifts in household production and consumption. An important source of intrahousehold bargaining power is ownership of assets, especially land. Another strand examines gender bias in spending on children. This paper addresses both strands simultaneously. In it, differences in spending on education are examined empirically, at both the household and the individual level. Results are mixed, though the balance of evidence weighs toward pro-male bias in spending on education at the household level. Results also indicate that the relationship between asset ownership and female bargaining power within the household is contingent on the type of asset.

Married with Children: A Collective Labor Supply Model with Detailed Time Use and Intrahousehold Expenditure Information

We propose a collective labor supply model with household production that generalizes an original model of Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005). In our model, adults' individual preferences do not only depend on own leisure and individual private consumption of market goods. They also depend on the consumption of domestic goods, which are produced by combining goods bought at the market with individuals' time. We apply our model to new and unique data on Dutch couples with children. The data contains detailed information about the spouses' time use and the intrahousehold allocation of all expenditures. Our application uses a novel estimation strategy that builds upon the familiar two-stage allocation representation of the collective model. We obtain interesting (and plausible) empirical results. Spouses’ preferences depend on the consumption of domestically produced goods (including children's welfare). Next, Pareto weights depend on variables like the individual wages and the share in the household’s nonlabor income. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, we do not find evidence that mothers care more for their children than fathers.collective model, labor supply, time use, public goods, household production

Dowry and Intrahousehold Bargaining: Evidence from China

This paper analyzes the relationship between a woman’s intrahousehold bargaining position and her welfare within marriage. Simultaneity problems common to the literature are overcome by using dowry to proxy for bargaining position. Omitted variable bias is addressed by using grain shocks in the year preceding marriage and sibling sex composition as instruments for dowry. Instrumented dowry positively impacts several measures of a wife’s welfare, including time allocation, household purchases, and the wife’s decision-making authority, thereby offering strong evidence to support collective models of the household.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39994/3/wp608.pd

ESTIMATION AND TESTING OF HOUSEHOLD LABOUR SUPPLY MODELS: EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN

This paper provides an empirical contribution to the current debate about the suitability of the collective model proposed by Chiappori (1988, 1992) for analysing intrahousehold behaviour in the labour supply context. We follow Chiappori et al.(2002) and we extend the model considering differences in the education level between the two members of the couple as a potential distribution factor. Moreover, we propose a particular parametric specification for the labour supply system in order to derive the restrictions imposed by the collective setting on observed household behaviour. The empirical results show that neither the unitary model nor the collective one fits the Spanish household labour supply data.Households behaviour, labour supply, collective model, unitary model

The Collective Household Enterprise Model: An Empirical Analysis

This paper estimates a household model where both the production and consumption sides are observed. The household activities produce both marketable and nonmarketable products. Family members consume market goods, domestically produced goods and leisure. This household equilibrium model is described within a collective framework. The data are from a nation-wide sample of Italian farm-households. The estimation is implemented using a generalized Heckman estimator to account for corner solutions generated by the fact that not all households are engaged in all enterpreneurial activities and do not consume some of all goods and leisure. The identification of the sharing rule stems from the assignability of clothing consumption and leisure.Household collective model, household and domestic productions, consumption and leisure, separability, Consumer/Household Economics,

Dowry and Intrahousehold Bargaining: Evidence from China

This paper analyzes the relationship between a woman’s intrahousehold bargaining position and her welfare within marriage. Simultaneity problems common to the literature are overcome by using dowry to proxy for bargaining position. Omitted variable bias is addressed by using grain shocks in the year preceding marriage and sibling sex composition as instruments for dowry. Instrumented dowry positively impacts several measures of a wife’s welfare, including time allocation, household purchases, and the wife’s decision-making authority, thereby offering strong evidence to support collective models of the household.Intrahousehold Allocation, Dowry and Brideprice, Marriage, China

Pooling of Income and Sharing of Consumption within Households

There are extensive literatures within economics and economic psychology on the allocation of household income within the household. These two literatures are largely disjoint but both use a concept of ‘income pooling’. In economics this refers to the independence of household decisions from who receives the income within the household. In economic psychology it refers to the management of household finances. This article uses a new Danish expenditure survey that gives information on both concepts and on the assignment of expenditures to consider the link between the two. More importantly, we investigate whether either type of pooling is related to the sharing of expenditures between the two partners. We find that sharing does depend on who receives the income within non-pooling households, but not on the economic psychological income pooling regime per se.household production and intra-household allocation; personal income; wealth and their distributions; methodology for collecting, estimating, and organizing microeconomic data; marriage and family

Altruism, Cooperation, and Efficiency: Agricultural Production in Polygynous Households

Altruism among family members can, in some cases, inhibit cooperation by increasing the utility that players expect to receive in a non-cooperative equilibrium. To test this, we examine agricultural productivity in polygynous households in West Africa. We find that cooperation is greater – production is more efficient – among co-wives than among husbands and wives because co-wives are less altruistic towards each other. The results are not driven by scale effects or self-selection into polygyny. Nor can they be explained by greater propensity for cooperation among women generally or by the household head acting as an enforcement mechanism for others' cooperative agreements.altruism, non-cooperative behavior, household bargaining, polygyny, Africa